It verges on the platitudinous to say that Wittgenstein's own treatment of the question of a private language has been almost lost to view under mountains of commentary in the last twenty years-so much so, that no one with a concern for his own health would try to arrive at a verdict on the question by first mastering the available discussion. But a general acquaintance with the commentaries indicates that opinion on the matter can be roughly divided into two categories: that of the Old Orthodoxy (both defenders and attackers of Wittgenstein are included), most recently represented by Robert Fogelin in his book Wittgenstein; 1 and that of what may be termed the New Guardians of the Wittgenstein Tradition, apparently based in Oxford and headed by Anthony Kenny, 2 who in his book Wittgenstein 3 has proposed a new account of the argument of Philosophical Investigations § §256-271. The important difference between the old and new orthodoxies will be considered later.
One consequence of the enormous literature on this subject is that, as Fogelin points out, 4 'a tradition has grown up concerning the central features of [Wittgenstein's] argument and the discussion is often carried out quite independently of the original Wittgenstein text'. I would go further than this, and say that the discussion has almost always been carried out quite independently of the text, in this sense: that nearly all 1 commentators on the argument have quarried the text for remarks which I suit their purposes, ignoring those which do not fit their preconceptions, and have almost never tried to give an account which is coherent in the i Stewart Candlish sense that it respects Wittgenstein's own ordering of all his remarks. 5 (I shall deal with the kind of 'tradition' to which Fogelin refers, in section V, below.) Now Fogelin explicitly, and Kenny (though normally an unrepentant quarrier) implicitly, tries to return the discussion to the text. In this paper I shall argue that both fail (for different reasons) to give a coherent reading of Investigations § §256-271 ; 6 I shall try to provide one myself; and I shall argue that on this new account the most widely accepted objection to the argument can be seen to have no force.
II
Having established in § §244-255 that our language is not a 'private language' Wittgenstein turns, at §256, to the question whether anything could be such a language. He continues to speak of sensations, and of pain in particular, but it is crucial to remember that these are not our sensations but those of something like a Cartesian soul (perhaps one associated with a physical body, as indicated in § §257 and 283) which has no visible life and whose 'sensations' are accordingly utterly private. Thus in §256 Wittgenstein indicates that one cannot arrive at the idea of a private language by considering our own language, for our sensations are expressed. But neither can we arrive at the idea by taking our own language as a starting point and simply subtracting from it all the expression of sensations, as he considers in §256 (a temporary paralysis is clearly not in question), for as he says in §257, even if there could be language in a situation such as this where teaching is impossible, the earlier argument of the Investigations, concerning ostensive definition, has shown that mere 'mental association' of one thing with another is not alone sufficient to make one thing a name of another. Naming one's sensation requires one to have, as it were, a place to put the new word, a notion of sensation.
Ill
The rash of scare quotes in the previous paragraph requires some explaining, for they are part of a general difficulty involved in discussing the idea of a private language, namely, that one is forced to use words in doing so when 5 I do not entirely except myself from this: see my 'Wittgenstein's Attack on the Idea of a Private Language', Journal of the Philosophical Association, 14, No. 45, 1973, 1-20 it is just the propriety of using these words which is in question. Thus Wittgenstein is forced to speak of ostensive definition, concentrating the attention, speaking, writing, remembering, believing and so on, in the very process of suggesting that none of these things can really be done in the situation he is indicating. (This is the point of §261: a proper description of this situation could be given only by an inarticulate sound.)
The point is by now relatively familiar, but is nevertheless worth making again in the present context, since it particularly bedevils the discussion of the private linguist who keeps a diary of his sensations, which we come to next. For example, Fogelin 7 treats the diary case as one where he himself keeps a diary and records the occurrences of a sensation which he finds it impossible to describe to anyone else. It should be made clear once and for all that we are not to think of the description of the keeping of the diary as a description of a possible or even ultimately intelligible case. In particular, we are not to think of a human being's keeping a diary, and Miss Anscombe's use of 'man' and 'person' in the translation of §260 are not justified by the German. At this stage we are simply not to worry about whether the diary story ultimately makes sense or not.
IV
Let us now return to the text. In §256 Wittgenstein asked of the 'private language', 'How do I use words to stand for my sensations?', and reminded us in §257 that we cannot answer 'As we ordinarily do'. So this question, which is the same question as 'How do I obtain meaning for the expressions in a "private language" ?', is still open; and the answer must be independent of our actual connections between words and sensations.
What Wittgenstein does now, at §258, is give the private language theorist a run for his money by taking for granted, temporarily (despite the strictures of §257) the notion of sensation, and imagining himself (ultimately unintelligibly) in the position of a private linguist who keeps a diary. The aim is to show that even if we make this concession, meaning for a sensation-word still cannot be secured and maintained by such a linguist. Here begins the crucial double-headed argument which is the centrepiece of this whole discussion.
Wittgenstein points out of the diary case 'first of all that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated'-presumably because this is to be a case of establishing a language and no other words are to be presupposed, and not because of some empiricist point about indefinables. So if meaning is to be obtained it has to be done by a private analogue of ostensive definition, where I concentrate on the sensation and produce the sign at the same time. But if this is to be a genuine ostensive definition it has to establish the con-7 Op. tit., 159. nection between sign and sensation, and this connection must persist. As Wittgenstein says, " ' I impress [the connection] on myself" can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection right in the future'. For I do not define anything, even to myself, by merely attending to something and making a mark, if this episode is supposed to have no consequences.
V
Now let us look at this remark 'I remember the connection right in the future'. As Kenny points out, it has given rise to a crucial and persistent misunderstanding of the whole argument, for it has usually been interpreted as a demand that, for the sign 'S' to have been given a meaning, it must always figure thereafter (if used affirmatively) as or in a true statement -that is, I must use the sign 'S' affirmatively only when I really do have the sensation S (unless I lie, which I cannot do to myself). And it has generally been thought that the subsequent argument concerns the adequacy of memory to ensure that I do not mistakenly call a different kind of sensation 'S' on a future occasion. This standard account of the argument, and its history, is summed up by Kenny on pp. 191-192: Many philosophers have taken 'I remember the connection right' to mean 'I use "S" when and only when I really have S'. They then take Wittgenstein's argument to be based on scepticism about memory: how can you be sure that you have remembered aright when next you call a sensation 'S'? In support of this interpretation they may quote Wittgenstein's advice 'Always get rid of the private object in this way: assume that it constantly changes, but that you do not notice the change because your memory constantly deceives you' (PI II, 207) .
Critics of Wittgenstein have found the argument, so interpreted, quite unconvincing. Surely, they say, the untrustworthiness of memory presents no more and no less a problem for the user of a private language than for the user of a public one. No, Wittgenstein's defenders have said, for memory-mistakes about public objects may be corrected, memory-mistakes about private sensations cannot; and where correction is impossible, talk of correctness is out of place. At this point critics of Wittgenstein have either denied that truth demands corrigibility, or have sought to show that checking is possible in the private case too.
It is this interplay of criticism and defence which I have labelled the Old Orthodoxy. Fogelin is a good example of this tradition since on his pp. 162-164 (there is no short quotable passage which could be used to illustrate the points neatly) he makes it quite clear that he takes Wittgenstein's argument to be an attempt to secure a special advantage from general scepticism about memory; and he spans both of Kenny's classes of critics by denying that truth demands (absolute) corrigibility and suggesting that (limited) checking is available in the private case. 8 No doubt the reason for the popularity of this kind of interpretation is threefold, (i) People committed to the idea of a private language are generally looking for an arrangement in which mistakes of fact are impossible; that is, are trying to overcome scepticism by finding absolute certainty. And this would make the deployment of sceptical arguments appear a natural weapon to use in reply to them. Thus Fogelin says, 9 '. . . the private language argument gets us back to the familiar grounds on which modern philosophy has had many of its battles', and immediately goes on to talk of finding the foundation of knowledge in subjective self-certainty. (2) It is plausible (I do not say correct) to suppose that one cannot be mistaken concerning the natures of one's present sensations and it could thus seem crippling to the idea of a private language if it could be proved that the idea entailed that one is just as fallible on this subject as on any other. (3) Presumably getting meanings right could result in infallibility since it is not clear what taking a sensation to be other than it is could amount to, except a failure of meaning. But the interpretation of §258 which I shall urge here, following Kenny, makes the question of infallibility in future uses of the sign'S' essentially extraneous to the argument.
10
Kenny says, rightly, of the Old Orthodoxy, 'Both criticism and defence rest on a misunderstanding of the argument'. If we look at §258 closely, we see that 'I remember the connection' refers to remembering a meaning, namely the meaning of the sign 'S', not to making sure that I call only S's 'S' in the future. (Of course it might well be expected to have this effect when S's are sensations, as I pointed out in the previous paragraph, but that is not the point here.) And even to make a mistake of fact in a future judgment I must employ terms which have meaning. (Kenny says here that I must know their meaning, too, and he may be right; but this begins to lead him into the mistake I shall point out in the next section.) VI Now that we are clearer about what is at stake, let us return to §258. 8 Fogelin does, however, think that Wittgenstein proves the weaker claim of the contingent impossibility of a private language.
9 Ibid., 153. 10 This makes what I said on the final page of my earlier article (see note 5) apply, not to Wittgenstein's argument itself, but rather to an application of itan application which attempts to show that a 'private language' which attempts to retain our assumed infallibility concerning our actual sensations is selfdefeating. This application is suggested in the final paragraph of §288; but I implicitly suggested formerly that §288 summed up the whole of what had gone before. The present interpretation makes no reliance on the assumption of infallibility concerning our actual sensations, and indeed the question of infallibility is here regarded as irrelevant.
Imagine a private linguist who 'believes' himself to have established, ostensively, a meaning for a sign 'S', and who later uses this sign to judge that he is at present experiencing the sensation S. It can be asked of him, 'What does he mean by "S"?' And one of two answers could be given.
One of these answers receives from Wittgenstein very short shrift indeed; it is the answer that what the speaker means by 'S' is just this (sort of) sensation he is now having. Of this answer Wittgenstein says . . . whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'.
What this says in a highly condensed form is as follows. If we are to speak of being right or wrong, of making some factual assertion which stands a chance of being either true or false, then the source of the meaning of what we say must be different from the source of its truth. To suppose that we can confront an object and say of it 'This is S' and also say that this is what the sign 'S' means is to deprive our initial statement of the status of assertion-it becomes, at best, ostensive definition. (The 'at best' is important here, for the reasons given in section III.) Such trying to have one's cake and eat it too is particularly tempting when one is a philosopher searching for empirical certainty-but the moment one achieves it, in this way, one immediately loses the required factual status of what one says.
11
What is the other answer which could be given to the question, 'What does he mean by "S"?' It is that he means, not this (kind of) present sensation, but sensations of the kind that he named 'S' in the past. It is in describing Wittgenstein's treatment of this response that Kenny goes wrong:
Suppose next that the private-language speaker says 'By " S " I mean the sensation I named " S " in the past'. Since he no longer has the past sensation he must rely on memory: he must call up a memory-sample of S and compare it with his current sensation to see if the two are alike. But of course he must call up the right memory. Now is it possible that the wrong memory might come at this call? If not, then 'S' means whatever memory occurs to him in connection with 'S', and again whatever seems right is right. If so, then he does not really know what he means. It is no use his saying 'Well, at least I believe that this is the sensation "S" again', for he cannot even believe that without knowing what 'S' means (PI I, 26o).i2 11 This point is one on which Wittgenstein continually dwelt. Cf. Investigations, p. 18 n; 'Notes for Lectures ', Philosophical Review, 77, 1968, 276-277, 314, 320;  Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, II, §37.
12 Kenny, op. cit., 194. Hacker's account of this passage, though more obscurely put than Kenny's, is essentially the same. Cf. p. 236 of Insight and Illusion (1975 edn) . Now Kenny has said earlier, and I agree with him, that 'I remember the connection' has to refer to remembering a meaning, and accordingly the usual discussions of that remark are misplaced. But he suggested implicitly too that the whole question of scepticism about memory has no place in the discussion of 'private language'; and that I think is right as well, for the text simply does not support it. Yet here he is in the above passage suggesting that the burden of Wittgenstein's argument is something far less plausible than scepticism about memory; for now the argument becomes: 'If it is possible for me to misremember my previous ostensive definition of "S", then I do not really know what " S " means'. And it is an elementary point of epistemology that knowing something does not obviously entail that it is logically impossible for one to be wrong about that thing, only that one is not in fact wrong.
13
What has gone wrong here? Kenny, along with almost everyone else I know of, has assumed that even in the circumstances of the 'private language' there is actually an application of a sign to a sensation by a private linguist, and that the problem is one of later remembering this earlier application in order that'S' should have meaning (or possibly, be known to have meaning). The question then seems to be whether our admittedly fallible memory is adequate for the securing or maintenance of (possibly knowledge of) meaning. But why should we assume that a private linguist could even ostensively define his sign to himself in the first place? As I pointed out in section III, this is just one of the matters in question; and § §260 and 261 (the former of which Kenny is forced to distort, and the latter to ignore) show that Wittgenstein was not prepared to allow an argument in favour of private language to proceed from this assumption. § §262 and 263 reinforce his objection. Wittgenstein in these sections reminds us, among other things, that his arguments in the earlier sections of the Investigations showed that ostensive definition was not accomplished by any performance unless certain circumstantial conditions are fulfilled-and nothing about the diary case as so far described shows them to be fulfilled. It is only later ( § §270-271) that Wittgenstein imagines a partial fulfilment of them, and the result there is to render the language public.
One of the things that people have misinterpreted is Wittgenstein's insistence that there must be a distinction between obeying a rule and merely thinking that one has. But this does not (as has been commonly supposed) result in a demand for, and eventual rejection of, 'memory-infallibility in a private language': the demand and rejection being based respectively on the grounds that without it one could always be going wrong and would never know if one were, and with it one would collapse the distinction between obeying a rule and merely thinking one was obeying it. Rather, the j argument is this. The private linguist cannot legislate a meaning for a sign ! by 'private ostensive definition' merely-for this has to establish a technique \ ( §260). The technique cannot function by means of repeated 'ostensive definitions', as we have seen, since this is to collapse the distinction between meaning and truth and thus to destroy the possibility of making judgments. So the 'definition' has on some other basis to establish a constancy in use of the sign. But this is just what is in question. What would constancy be ' here? What would be 'going on in the same way with the sign' ? The same way as what, precisely? As there cannot be assumed to be a way of using the : sign which the linguist even succeeds in determining, let alone establishing, and which is the correct way, independent of the linguist's later impression of the correct way, then a defender of 'private language' would have to show that there was. And it might seem as if one could show this by appealing to the private linguist's memory. He simply remembers how he used the sign before. And this looks straightforward enough, for one thinks: he certainly did something before, for he remembers it. (And we do not require his memory to be infallible.) But the memory does have to be of something determinate which existed independently of the memory of it; and how can the 'memory' alone show this? This is the argument of §265, which is usually so badly misunderstood. Again we cannot assume that there has been an actual table of meanings in the case of the private linguist, even a mental one, which is now recalled and about which he has to rely on recall since the table itself has gone. Rather, as § §260-264 show, there may be nothing determinate other than the 'remembering of the table'. So when we think that a private linguist could remember the meaning of'S' by remembering a past correlation of the sign 'S' with a sensation, we are supposing what needs to be itself established -that there was some independent correlation to be remembered. But this is what the 'memory' was itself supposed to prove; and it clearly cannot do it. If, alternatively, we do not suppose that there is something independent of the memory to be remembered, again 'what seems right is right': the 'memory' of the 'correlation' is being employed to confirm itself for there is no independent access to the 'remembered correlation'. (Not even the independent access that we have as posers of the example, since the question is, can we pose such an example?) This is why Wittgenstein says 'As if someone were to buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true'.
We can now give a place to § §266-268, ignored by Kenny; for fairly clearly they are examples illustrating the points just made.
VII
At §269 the discussion takes a new turn by moving from examples of souls unrelated to bodies or related only to inert bodies, to examples where there is bodily behaviour but where we are also tempted to think of a private meaning for words, independent of their public use. Wittgenstein speaks of three cases in this context, all ordinary ones whose existence we can determine in practice. There is that of the man who understands a word; that of the man who fails to understand it and is at a complete loss; and that of the man who thinks he understands, who attaches his own incorrect meaning to the word. The third case here, he seems to suggest, might appear to be generalizable, such that a whole series of sounds not understood by anyone else, but apparently understood by their producer, might tempt us to speak of private meanings lying behind public behaviour.
This suggests a last chance for a defender of the idea of a private language: that a private linguist might secure a meaning for his sign 'S' by correlating its use with some public phenomenon. This would apparently serve to provide the noting of 'S' with a function ( §260) and thus give a place for ostensive definition, and would give as well a guarantee that there is some constancy in the linguist's use of the term 'S' independent of his impression of such constancy. Wittgenstein uses the example of the manometer in § §270 and 271 to consider this idea, and his criticism of it is in effect that this method of securing meaning works, but at the price of revealing that the 'private object' is irrelevant to meaning. Presumably a defender of 'private language' would hope that the example would work like this: if I keep saying, on the basis of my sensation, that my blood pressure is rising, and the manometer shows that I am right, then this success shows that I had in fact established a private meaning for the sign 'S' and was using the sign in the same way each time to judge that my sensation was the same each time. However, all the example really shows is that just thinking that I have the same sensation now as I had when my blood pressure rose formerly, can be a good guide to the rising of my blood pressure. Whether in some private sense the sensation was 'actually the same' or not becomes utterly irrelevant to the question of constancy in the use of 'S'-i.e. there is no gap between the actual nature of the sensation and my impression of it, and 'S' here could mean no more than 'sensation of the rising of the blood pressure'; p indeed, for all we are told of the sign's role, it could even mean merely 'blood j pressure rising'.
[ VIII The alternative view of Kenny and Hacker, which arose in response to observing that misreading, results, as we saw further, in a version of the argument so wildly fallacious that it would be unreasonable to suppose it a fair reflection of Wittgenstein's reasoning; and accordingly, I have tried to provide a version of the argument which is faithful to the text and which avoids both the old and the new errors.
All that remains is to show that the version offered here is not vulnerable to the usual criticism of the Old Orthodoxy, namely that the argument rules out a public language as well, or at least the (quite conceivable) case of language devised by only one person without his having first been taught another language by someone else.
Part of this task has implicitly been accomplished already by showing that scepticism concerning memory is no part of the argument and hence it cannot be a general threat to the possibility of something we already know to be actual, i.e. the language which we already have. Showing this involved throwing rather more of the burden of the argument back on the question of ostensive definition which may later be remembered (or not).
It is obvious that this argument could not apply to our actual language; but nor could it rule out in advance all hypothetical cases of 'Robinson Crusoes'. For there is no a priori barrier to imagining a form of life complex enough for us to be assured that a determinate ostensive definition could be accomplished by such a being. A 'Robinson Crusoe', unlike a private linguist, lives in a world independent of his impressions of it, and thus there are definite occurrences in it which he could remember (or forget); and some of these occurrences could be correlations of signs with objects.
But the virtue of the present account of the private language argument is not that it rescues the argument from an obvious objection; it is that it gives, what is not presently on offer, a coherent reading of the whole of the central part of Wittgenstein's own text. ' (Philosophical Quarterly, 1967, reprinted in O. R. Jones (ed.) The Private Language Argument) which contains an account of § §258 and 265 that is close to mine at several points; however, we diverge on the interpretation of other passages, and his targets are Mundle and Ayer while mine are Kenny and Fogelin.
